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1 
“LOVE DON’T LIVE HERE ANYMORE”: 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR A MORE 
EQUITABLE MODEL OF URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT 
Michèle Alexandre* 
Abstract: The exclusion of poor, underprivileged people in urban re-
newal projects has been discussed in depth by a number of scholars. 
While this issue is far from resolved, the post-Katrina redevelopment 
plans provide an opportunity to re-evaluate notions of how to best rede-
velop urban spaces. In this Article, the author attempts to show that the 
interests of poor individuals can converge with those of city officials and 
developers in order to prevent the exclusion of the poor in post-Katrina 
New Orleans as well as future cities. To do so, the author relies on Law 
and Economics’ notion of the maximization of incentives and Critical 
Race Theory’s Interest Convergence Theory. 
Introduction 
 Her story is all too common in contemporary urban life. For fif-
teen years, Sue Ann,1 a working-class mother, lived with her two chil-
dren in a small two-bedroom apartment located in a mixed-use neigh-
borhood in a large urban center. In the past five years, her neighbor-
hood underwent dramatic change as eager developers and trendy 
young professionals flooded into the neighborhood. Their arrival was 
accompanied by internet cafes, coffee shops, and bookstores. To ac-
commodate their upper-class demands, residential apartment buildings 
were gutted and transformed into new condos and lofts. 
 After watching these transformations take place around her, Sue 
Ann was notified one day that the developers set their sights on her 
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1 Sue Ann is a fictional character used here to illustrate the plight and experiences of 
millions of individuals. 
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apartment building. Sue Ann’s landlord informed the building’s resi-
dents of her decision to sell the complex. Sue Ann must now find a 
new home for herself and her children. However, she has been priced 
out of her neighborhood, given the reality that the lowest rent in this 
“revitalized” community is seventy-five percent greater than her cur-
rent rent. The closest affordable housing is in a remote area of town, 
which will increase her commute to work by forty-five minutes.2 Fur-
thermore, the school system in the remote area leaves a lot to be de-
sired.3 
 This story of displacement is so recurring that it is fast becoming 
one of the formative experiences of America’s low-income, urban popu-
lations.4 There are increasing numbers of families5 in urban centers 
who are finding themselves physically excluded6 and economically mar-
ginalized7 from their long-time residences and communities as a result 
of urban renewal.8 Urban renewal refers to the process by which muni-
cipalities, in conjunction with developers, target sections of a city 
regarded as low-income, barren, and/or blighted and redevelop those 
areas in order to—among many reasons—increase property values and 
                                                                                                                      
2 See generally G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? 173–84 (Prentice-Hall 
1983), available at http://www.worldfreeinternet.net/news/urban.htm (only pages 173–84 
are available online) (a history of developers’ involvement in urban renewal in its various 
forms). 
3 See generally The New Haven Oral History Project, Life in the Model City: Stories of 
Urban Renewal in New Haven (2004), http://www.yale.edu/nhohp/modelcity (offering 
audio files of interviews with New Haven residents impacted by a redevelopment plan). 
4 See James Geoffrey Durham & Dean E. Sheldon III, Mitigating the Effects of Private Revi-
talization on Housing for the Poor, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (1986). The authors note that, 
“The incidence of displacement on a national level is significant . . . .” Id. at 13. There are 
1.7 million people displaced every year. Id. at 14. 
5 See Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighbor-
hoods Hurts America, and What We Can Do About It 4–7 (2004). 
6 See, e.g., The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12–14 (2005) (statement of Hilary O. Shelton, 
Director, Washington Bureau, NAACP); Charles Toutant, Alleging Race-Based Condemnation 
Suits Claim Municipal Redevelopment Plans Fall Disproportionately on Low-Income, Minority 
Neighborhoods, Raising Equal Protection Issues, 17 N.J.L.J. 357, 357 (2004); Eric L. Silkwood, 
Note, The Downlow on Kelo: How an Expansive Interpretation of the Public Use Clause Has 
Opened the Floodgates for Eminent Domain Abuse, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 493, 521–22 (2007) (dis-
cussing Mr. Shelton’s testimony); see also Erik Schwartz, Progress or Discrimination?, Courier-
Post (Cherry Hill, N.J.), Aug. 5, 2004, at 1G. 
7 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(noting that mid-century development plans employed the Court’s expansive understand-
ing of public use to displace significant numbers of non-white or low-income families). 
8 See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick, The Story of Urban Renewal, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 
21, 2000, at C1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/businessnews/20000521eastliberty1. 
asp. 
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attract higher-income individuals to the city.9 Among the problems 
caused by the displacement of low-income individuals is psychological 
strain on those residents who are emotionally attached and econom-
ically dependent on their homes and communities.10 
 While the definition of urban renewal changed during the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the effects of urban renewal 
have been the same for poor people living in the targeted neighbor-
hoods because their interests and voices continue to be excluded11 
from urban planning programs and development initiatives.12 In this 
                                                                                                                      
9 The City of New London represents a perfect example of the type of conditions that 
usually give rise to the implementation of urban renewal projects. According to the Court 
in Kelo: 
Decades of economic decline led a state agency in 1990 to designate the City 
[of New London] a “distressed municipality.” . . . In 1998, the City’s unem-
ployment rate was nearly double that of the State, and its population of just 
under 24,000 residents was at its lowest since 1920. 
 These conditions prompted state and local officials to target New London, 
and particularly its Fort Trumbull area, for economic revitalization. 
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. 
10 See Fullilove, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
11 See Silkwood, supra note 6, at 521–22 (“Indeed, urban renewal, which over its sketchy 
past has displaced scores of African-Americas [sic], came to be called ‘Negro removal’ 
instead of urban renewal. Further, scholars have noted how governments have ‘imple-
mented policies to segregate and maintain the isolation of the poor, minority, and other-
wise outcast populations’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
12 See Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 527, 546–48 (2006). Foster states: 
 In theory, land use decisions take place within a planning framework, 
done in accordance with a comprehensive plan. In practice, however, private 
market forces are more apt to directly influence land use decisions than any 
comprehensive public deliberative process that considers the larger social, 
economic, or environmental considerations that underlie land use within an 
urban area. Although there is some move toward stronger local planning re-
quirements, the prevailing law and practice remains a highly atomized ap-
proach. 
 The atomization of urban space has fragmented urban communities in 
ways that make “bridging” social capital difficult, undermining the formation 
of socially and economically integrated urban communities. This has had the 
consequence of isolating certain populations in ways that render them vul-
nerable to larger structural forces that are difficult for them to overcome 
without either stronger social and economic resources or collective action on 
the part of interests who have very little incentive to assist socially isolated 
communities. 
Id. at 546; see also Fullilove, supra note 5, at 20, 242 n.14. Fullilove describes urban re-
newal projects in the 1960s and 1970s as: 
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Article, I consider these persistent effects as they have impacted both 
property owners and lessees. Primarily, this Article concentrates on how 
the scope of public purpose, as it is used in eminent domain standards, 
may be expanded in order to implement more equitable renewal plans. 
I argue that equity-based redevelopment plans can help prevent the 
displacement and future exclusion of traditionally disadvantaged resi-
dents of the low-income communities that are normally targeted by re-
development plans. I suggest that a system of incentives that merges the 
interests of development planners with the interests of the urban poor 
be incorporated into all urban renewal plans so as to achieve more eq-
uitable results. In this way, I attempt to show that the interests of poor 
individuals can converge with those of city officials and developers. 
Derrick Bell’s Interest Convergence Theory inspires this incentive-
based urban renewal plan.13 More specifically, this Article will show that 
the interests of poor individuals can converge with those of city officials 
and developers. It will explore the intersection of Interest Maximiza-
tion14 and Interest Convergence Theory,15 and offer a modified defini-
                                                                                                                      
[P]rogram[s] of the federal government that provided money for cities to 
clear “blight.” . . . 
 By my estimate 1,600 black neighborhoods were demolished by urban re-
newal. This massive destruction caused root shock . . . . First, residents of each 
neighborhood experienced . . . the loss of their life world. . . . Root shock, 
post urban renewal, disabled powerful mechanisms of community function-
ing, leaving the black world at an enormous disadvantage for meeting the 
challenges of globalization. 
Id. at 220. Fullilove goes on to explain the reasons underlying her mathematical estimate: 
This estimate is based on the following pieces of information. According to 
the final report on urban renewal, there were 2,532 urban renewal projects in 
992 cities. A number of authors have reported that 75 percent of the people 
displaced were people of color and about 63 percent were African American. 
Id. at 242 n.14 (citation omitted). 
13 See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Conver-
gence Dilemma, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Move-
ment 20 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (introducing the Interest Convergence 
Theory). 
14 See id. at 22; James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, in Eco-
nomic Justice: Race, Gender, Identity and Economics 33, 33–34 (2005) [hereinafter 
Economic Justice]. White explains some of the assumptions of microeconomics are that: 
The universe is populated by . . . human actors, each of whom is competent, 
rational, and motivated solely by self-interest. External to the human actors is 
a natural universe that affords what are called “resources,” which are acted 
upon by human actors to create something called “wealth.” . . . Each actor is 
assumed to be motivated by an unlimited desire to acquire or consume. Since 
each is interested only in its own welfare, each is in structural competition 
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tion of public purpose that precludes the exclusion of economically 
disadvantaged individuals. 
 The definition of public purpose that I propose for courts review-
ing urban renewal projects is one that makes paramount the nondis-
placement of poor residents. In addition, I argue that intangible con-
tributions made by pre-redevelopment community residents to the 
redeveloped communities must be preserved and computed in the type 
of “just compensation” awarded to homeowners, as well in the types of 
amenities provided for low-income renters in the post-renewal commu-
nity. The computation of intangible contributions of poor community 
members to the redeveloped communities would adequately acknowl-
edge the role that the pre-redevelopment residents’ social capital16 
plays in increasing the value of the community. That role is discussed in 
this Article when analyzing the proposed redefinition of public pur-
pose. Furthermore, I borrow from international law’s17 recognition of 
indigenous18 populations’ right to return to their homeland, as well as 
the now established standards of environmental justice, to further sup-
port the basis for expanding the definition of public purpose to pre-
vent the displacement of poor residents. 
 Part I of the Article discusses conventional notions of public pur-
pose and explores incentives that local governments have traditionally 
offered to attract private developers.19 In Part I, I also propose a redefi-
nition of public purpose that takes into account the intangible contri-
butions and value of the residents/indigenous people of pre-redevel-
oped communities. Part II investigates the possibilities of a more egali-
tarian model of urban redevelopment by applying the Interest Conver-
gence Theory to urban renewal plans.20 Part III proposes such an egali-
tarian redevelopment model using redevelopment plans in post-
                                                                                                                      
with all the others. . . . The final ingredient is money, a medium in which sur-
plus can be accumulated with convenience and, in principle, without limit. 
Id. 
15 Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, in Economic Justice, supra note 
14, at 173, 175. 
16 See Foster, supra note 12, at 529. 
17 Draft United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2 (Aug. 26, 1994), 34 I.L.M. 541, 546 (Westlaw). 
18 See generally Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel 
Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 155 (2006) (discussing whether the sov-
ereignty of indigenous people can coexist with the sovereignty of the state in international 
law). 
19 See infra Part I. 
20 See infra Part II. 
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Hurricane Katrina New Orleans as a promising example.21 Ultimately, 
the Article will explore the ways in which the interests of developers 
and politicians may converge with those of homeowners and renters in 
urban renewal cases. 
I. Public Purpose and the Traditional Use of Incentives in 
Urban Renewal Projects 
 Eminent domain is the power of the government to expropriate 
private properties.22 The Constitution does not explicitly grant this 
power.23 Instead, the Constitution tacitly recognizes that the power to 
expropriate inheres in governments24 and requires, in the Takings 
Clause, that the government pay “just compensation” in exchange for 
an expropriation.25 “Just compensation” is interpreted as an attempt 
to balance a valued interest in property rights with the government’s 
need to sometimes appropriate private property for public benefit.26 
Eminent domain continuously positions individuals’ sacrosanct rights 
to their property against the need of government to make decisions 
consistent with the welfare of the general public.27 The evidence of 
the sanctified nature of individual property rights lies in the very ad-
monishment of the Framers of the Constitution that property shall 
                                                                                                                      
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See 1 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.11 (3d ed. 2006); 29A 
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 2 (1992). 
23 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
24 See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946) (confirming that eminent 
domain is “a tacit recognition of a preexisting power”). 
25 U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). 
26 See William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments 
on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269, 269–70 (1988) 
(“The compensation requirement thus serves the dual purpose of offering a substantial 
measure of protection to private entitlements, while disciplining the power of the state, 
which would otherwise overexpand unless made to pay for the resources that it con-
sumes.”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1171–72 (1967) (discussing “just 
compensation” in terms of fairness); see also Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just 
Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 125, 137 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and 
Just Compensation, 9 Const. Comment. 279, 280 (1992); William A. Fischel & Perry 
Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 
115, 115 (1989); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 
285, 289 (1990); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 
1333–34 (1991). 
27 See Carmack, 329 U.S. at 236–37. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, 34 Stan L. Rev. 957 (1982) (discussing the relationship between property rights 
and personhood). 
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not be taken without “just compensation.”28 Armed with such protec-
tion, it is no surprise that private property owners become incensed 
when those property rights become endangered by takings decisions 
that seem to fall beyond the scope of public welfare and seem to fit 
closer to that of private interests.29 In the early years of the United 
States, subsequent to the passage of the Bill of Rights, the Takings 
Clause served as a tool to achieve a proper structuring of cities and 
communities.30 At that time, the public use mandate of the Takings 
Clause was carried to its literal meaning in that it granted local gov-
ernment the right to use private property for the creation of items 
open to the general public.31 
A. Kelo v. City of New London and the Evolution of Public Purpose 
 The tension between the sanctity of property rights and the gov-
ernment’s need to sometimes limit property rights—either through 
regulatory taking or expropriation—has given rise to substantial litiga-
tion.32 Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a robust in-
terpretation of the Takings Clause and the meaning of “just compensa-
                                                                                                                      
28 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
29 See Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving "Public Use" as 
a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City Of New London, 54 
Drake L. Rev. 171, 220–21 (2005) (discussing the impact of takings that do not have a 
direct effect on public welfare). Fuhrmeister states: 
 Although municipalities and developers often have nothing to lose under 
these economic development schemes, the private property owners located in 
the midst of an economic development area have everything to lose . . . . 
 . . . . Such is the case of economic development takings in which the an-
ticipated benefits are only indirectly related to the taking itself and are de-
pendent upon the financial health of an independent, private entity that 
cannot guarantee a certain amount of jobs or tax dollars. 
Id. 
30 See Donald L. Beschle, The Supreme Court's IOLTA Decision: Of Dogs, Mangers, and the 
Ghost of Mrs. Frothingham, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 846, 890–91 (2000) (discussing the 
weight of individual interests against the goal of a city in that “[t]he Takings Clause . . . 
limit[s] both the owner's power to frustrate the community and the community's power 
through the requirement of just compensation”). 
31 See Silkwood, supra note 6, at 502–22. “The interpretation of public use as public 
purpose endured as the method of determining proper and improper takings into the mid 
1900’s.” Id. at 502 (citing Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). 
32 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Old Dominion 
Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 
U.S. 112 (1896). 
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tion” under the Constitution.33 I will examine three important Su-
preme Court cases, Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 
and Kelo, to analyze the evolution of public purpose.34 
 Eminent domain triggers controversies because many perceive it as 
an extreme form of governmental intrusion.35 The government, in 
turn, usually argues that eminent domain is necessary to solve holdout 
problems that market inefficiencies create.36 Further, the government 
often argues that most public use or redevelopment projects acquire 
private properties through ordinary means.37 The use of eminent do-
main is designed to be a tool of last resort, to be used only in the case 
of holdout by one or more property owners.38 In this context, eminent 
domain is believed to be useful in preventing a few property owners 
                                                                                                                      
33 See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman, 
348 U.S. 26. 
34 See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26. 
35 See Gideon Kanner, Planning? We Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning, 2007 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 15, 19, available at SM006 ALI-ABA 15 (Westlaw). Kanner 
states: 
[I]t is now the widespread and not unjustified popular perception that the 
Court de facto declared economic war on people’s most cherished posses-
sions—their homes that are not merely their “property,” but also are tradi-
tionally thought of as places of security and repose, as well as places of family 
refuge that is [sic] secure from government intrusion. 
Id.; see also Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American Politics, 
42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 817, 848 (1993). Coyle writes: 
The courts’ confusion of takings doctrine with substantive due process has 
lessened the effectiveness of federal and state takings clauses as shields 
against government intrusion. When these two concepts are treated as one, 
with a single, rational basis standard so watered down as to permit virtually 
anything to pass, these protections of rights become empty shells. 
Id. 
36 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 62 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
Posner, Economic Analysis] (“A good economic argument for eminent domain . . . is 
that it is necessary to prevent monopoly.”). 
37 See id. at 61–62, 64. 
38 See id. at 62 (explaining that high transactions costs and bilateral monopolies can crip-
ple negotiations with holdouts); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Li-
ability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106–07 
(1972); Amanda W. Goodin, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 177, 186–87 (2007) (stating that eminent domain is often used to tackle holdout 
problems); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 80 (1986); 
Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl 3–7 (Univ. of Conn. 
Dep’t of Econ., Economics Working Papers No. 2004-38, 2006), available at http://digital- 
commons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=econ_wpapers. Contra 
Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 474–75 (1976) 
(questioning the holdout rationale for the exercise of eminent domain). 
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from thwarting the intended public benefit that the government an-
ticipates will flow from the taking.39 
 In the early period of takings jurisprudence, traditional eminent 
domain cases, mostly state cases, involved disputes over the taking of 
private properties to build highways and public roads.40 In 1875, the Su-
preme Court confirmed the state courts’ interpretations by limiting the 
use of eminent domain to “forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards 
and light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses.”41 
The Supreme Court did not deviate from this limitation until the mid-
dle of the twentieth century.42 
 In recent years, the Supreme Court has embraced the more ex-
pansive notion of takings for public use purposes, culminating in a 
broader notion of public purpose announced in Kelo.43 The Supreme 
Court decided Berman in 1954, finding the type of taking under review 
to be within the public use language of the Fifth Amendment.44 Berman 
involved private owners challenging the condemnation of their prop-
erty under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.45 The 
Act allowed the use of eminent domain to redevelop slums and 
blighted areas and the sale or lease of condemned lands to private buy-
ers.46 The private owners argued that their properties could not be 
taken because they were commercial properties, because the properties 
were not in a slum, and because the government would transfer their 
properties to private interests.47 The Berman Court rejected the private 
owners’ argument, holding that: 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 36, at 64–68 (making efficiency and 
public benefit arguments for takings). 
40 See Dickey v. Maysville, W.P. & L. Tpk. Rd. Co., 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113, 113 (1838); 
Katherine M. McFarland, Note, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandate 
for Stricter Scrutiny for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 142, 142–43 
(2004) (“The practice of eminent domain—the government’s power to take private prop-
erty for public use—was recognized by common law and originally used to facilitate the 
buildings of public roads, schools, and post offices.” (citing United States v. Chicago, 48 
U.S. 185, 194 (1849))). 
41 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); see McFarland, supra note 40, at 147. 
42 See Scott P. Ledet, Comment, The Kelo Effect: Eminent Domain and Property Rights in 
Louisiana, 67 La. L. Rev. 171, 181 (2006) (“A narrow construction of the public use provi-
sion of the takings clause was all but destroyed in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Berman v. Parker.”). 
43 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (announcing an in-
creasingly broad definition of public purpose). 
44 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954). 
45 Id. at 28. 
46 Id. at 29–31. 
47 Id. at 31. 
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled.48 
The Court denied the private owners’ challenge and found the taking 
to be lawful.49 
 The Berman Court rejected the invitation to second-guess the legis-
lature’s determination that the use of eminent domain would benefit 
the public.50 The Court embraced the notion of public purpose as the 
constitutional prerequisite for the exercise of eminent domain power.51 
This expanded view of public use—public purpose, in particular—is far 
removed from the Court’s early views that eminent domain should only 
be exercised when the use is one that is specifically open to the pub-
lic.52 
 The Court revisited eminent domain thirty years later in Midkiff, 
where it held that the government may condemn private land to break 
up a land ownership oligopoly in order to reestablish a free market.53 
The Court again followed Berman’s flexible interpretation of the public 
use/public purpose doctrine.54 Adopting the deference-to-legislature 
approach in Berman, Justice O’Connor argued in Midkiff that the role 
of the Court in determining public purpose is very narrow and should 
be invoked only when absolutely necessary.55 Justice O’Connor stated 
that, “The ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope 
of a sovereign’s police powers.”56 The Court continued: 
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. at 33 (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 36. 
50 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
51 See id. 
52 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
Prior to 1875, the federal government did not make any definitive statements on the scope 
of the public use admonishment of the Takings Clause. The state courts tackled taking for 
public purpose, approving uses such as the building of a university, a road, and a bridge. 
See generally Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. 
(7 Pick.) 344 (1829) (bridge); Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821 (Cir. Ct. 
D.N.J. 1830) (road); Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805) (university). 
53 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230, 245 (1984). 
54 Id. at 239–41; Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
55 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–41; see Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33. 
56 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. 
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There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a leg-
islature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even 
when the eminent domain power is equated with the police 
power. But the Court in Berman made clear that it is “an ex-
tremely narrow” one. The Court in Berman cited with approval 
the Court’s decision in Old Dominion [Land] Co. v. United States, 
which held that deference to the legislature’s “public use” de-
termination is required “until it is shown to involve an impos-
sibility.”57 
 The debate surrounding the definition of public purpose reached 
its peak in the Kelo decision in 2005.58 In further broadening the public 
purpose doctrine, the Court argued that public purpose extended be-
yond public use.59 In 1990, the City of New London was classified by a 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 
55, 66 (1925)). 
58 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80, 484–85 (2005). Because the 
debate is beyond the scope of this Article, I will use public purpose and public use syn-
onymously in the rest of this Article. Courts often refer to public purpose and public use 
interchangeably. I do, however, preserve public use in quoted materials. See Wendell E. 
Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 
21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 50 (2003). Pritchett states: 
Several recent law journal articles have critiqued the current interpretations 
of the doctrine. These scholars argue that eminent domain is used by “rent 
seeking” groups that want to avoid private market negotiations. They also 
claim that eminent domain is abused by public authorities that are controlled 
by private developers, and they argue for a stricter application of the [Public 
Use] Clause. 
Id. at 50; see also Rindge Co. v. County of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 705–06 (1923). The Court 
stated: 
The nature of a use, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial ques-
tion. However, the determination of this question is influenced by local con-
ditions; and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, should 
keep in view the diversity of such conditions and regard with great respect the 
judgments of state courts upon what should be deemed public uses in any 
State. 
Id. at 705–06 (stating that the use of eminent domain for a public highway qualifies as 
public use); see Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 190 n.5 
(1977); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain 161–62 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 136–37 
(1993). 
59 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (“[T]his ‘Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that 
condemned property be put into use for the general public.’” (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 
244)). Rather, the Court “embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public 
use as ‘public purpose.’” Id. at 480 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 
112, 158–64 (1896)). 
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state agency as a distressed city.60 In 2000, the city approved a develop-
ment plan that would create 1000 jobs, raise revenue, and renew the 
city.61 Having acquired most of the land needed for the renewal, the 
city developers instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire re-
maining land through eminent domain.62 The Supreme Court was 
asked to determine whether the city’s economic rejuvenation scheme 
served a public purpose within the meaning of the Takings Clause.63 
 Among other arguments, petitioners contended that economic 
development should not serve as the basis for a taking, nor should the 
city be able to use eminent domain to take nonblighted areas.64 Peti-
tioners asked the Court “to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic 
development does not qualify as a public use.”65 The Court rejected the 
invitation, arguing that “[p]romoting economic development is a tradi-
tional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, 
no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the 
other public purposes [the Court has] recognized.”66 Kelo completed 
the public purpose expansion, permitting the taking of private proper-
ties for economic rejuvenation absent any blight.67 The Court admitted 
that “[t]hose who govern the City were not confronted with the need to 
remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that 
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic re-
juvenation is entitled to our deference.”68 The Court sanctioned the 
power of government to allow private developers to take private prop-
erties for redevelopment under the eminent domain power.69 
 The Court’s expansion of public use70 is helpful to support the 
arguments for extending the meaning of public purpose that I pro-
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. at 473. 
61 Id. at 472 (“In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that, in 
the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, was ‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, 
including its downtown and waterfront areas.’” (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 
A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004))). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484–85. 
65 Id. at 484. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 483. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 483–86. 
70 See Silkwood, supra note 6, at 503. Silkwood states: 
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Berman v. Parker and Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, two seminal cases in the development of eminent 
 
2008] Economic Incentives for Improving Urban Redevelopments 13 
pose in this Article. If, as stated in Berman, public purpose can repre-
sent values that are “spiritual as well as physical,”71 intangibles such as 
social capital72 should be considered in the implementation of urban 
renewal plans. 
II. Interest Convergence and Public Purpose Redefined:  
A Utilitarian Justification for Reforms in Urban 
Redevelopment Cases 
A. Interest Convergence Defined and a Consideration of Ways of Converging 
Economic Interests for the Public Good 
 In his seminal article, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest 
Convergence Dilemma, Derrick Bell discussed the import of interest con-
vergence in civil rights cases: 
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be ac-
commodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites. However, the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, 
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial 
equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the su-
perior societal status of middle- and upper-class whites.73 
Bell specifically referred to the events that culminated in Brown and 
demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown correlated 
with the interest of the United States at the time.74 As demonstrated 
                                                                                                                      
domain law in the United States, are illustrative of the Court’s new, less re-
strictive approach to the use of eminent domain power. These decisions in-
troduced a broader interpretation of ‘public use’ by giving a great amount of 
deference to legislative definitions regarding what constituted a valid public 
use. 
Id. 
71 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
72 See Foster, supra note 12, at 529. Social capital refers to the value that the intangible 
contributions of individuals, such as cooperation, camaraderie, and a sense of unity, add to 
a particular community. This idea is explored in further detail at the end of Part II of this 
Article. See infra Part II. 
73 Bell, supra note 13, at 22; see also Derrick Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past: Getting Be-
yond the Civil Rights Decline, in Race in America: The Struggle for Equality 73–82 
(Herbert Hill & James E. Jones eds., 1993). 
74 Bell, supra note 13, at 22–23. According to Bell: 
First, the decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s 
struggle with communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging 
third world people. At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for both 
the NAACP and the federal government. . . . 
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in the case of desegregation, a coalescence of interests across sectors 
can aid in the protection of marginalized individuals.75 
 In the urban renewal context, the interests converging are typi-
cally those of city officials and developers in order to accomplish the 
designated projects.76 Unfortunately, the city officials and developers’ 
perception of public good often fails to consider the interest of eco-
nomically marginalized residents.77 Urban renewal projects not only 
attract new businesses to poor neighborhoods, but also often result in 
                                                                                                                      
 Second Brown offered much needed reassurance to American blacks that 
the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War II might 
yet be given meaning at home. Returning black veterans faced not only con-
tinuing discrimination but also violent attacks in the South which rivaled 
those that took place at the conclusion of World War I. . . . 
 Finally, there were whites who realized that the South could make the 
transition from a rural plantation society to the sunbelt with all its potential 
and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by state-
sponsored segregation. Thus, segregation was viewed as a barrier to further 
industrialization . . . . 
 Here, as in the abolition of slavery, there were whites for whom recogni-
tion of the racial equality principle was sufficient motivation. As with aboli-
tion, though, the number who would act on morality alone was insufficient to 
bring about the desired racial reform. 
Id. at 23. Another scholar has also supported the Interest Convergence Theory in her his-
torical analysis of the events that culminated to desegregation. See generally Mary L. 
Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. Am. Hist. 32 (2004) (describing the impact his-
torical events surrounding the Brown decision, such as the Cold War). According to 
Dudziak, the United States was under such international scrutiny at the time, that the 
Brown decision was an opportune and important moment to clean up the United States’s 
image and show the world that America’s propaganda about democracy was a reality on 
America’s soil. See id. at 32, 38. 
75 See Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Com-
parative Institutional Analysis, 15 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141, 153–54 (2007) (discussing the 
power of citizens with respect to the protection of property rights and noting that “[t]o the 
extent that the ‘interests of the common citizen’ include private property, it follows that 
sensitivity to the property rights of the common citizen is crucial to a government's politi-
cal survival and prosperity”). 
76 See, e.g., Silkwood, supra note 6, at 523 (showing the interplay of the city’s interest 
and private investors in Mississippi). Silkwood relates: 
The executive director of the Mississippi Development Authority explained, 
in an attempt to justify the takings, “It’s not that Nissan is going to leave if we 
don’t get the land. What’s important is the message it would send to other 
companies if we are unable to do what we said we would do. If you make a 
promise to a company like Nissan, you have to be able to follow through.” 
Clearly, the corporate dollars meant more to the Mississippi Development Au-
thority than the Constitutional rights of the minority homeowners whom they 
sought to uproot and displace. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
77 See id. at 521–23. 
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substituting the low-income residents and buildings formerly in that 
neighborhood with professional, middle class commercial and 
residential edifices.78 These projects are popular and can be very 
successful as formerly poor and isolated neighborhoods, over a period 
of five to ten years, become coveted by affluent developers.79 These 
changes can also contribute to more stable economies and provide 
opportunities for city officials to receive accolades.80 
 Judge Richard Posner proposed “that people are rational maxi-
mizers of their satisfactions” and “nothing they do is motivated by the 
public interest.”81 He further asserted that market inequities should 
be resolved by market participants’ own motivations and not by ex-
ternal regulations.82 In redevelopment cases, the maximization of sat-
isfactions, in the form of incentives, is not a new phenomenon.83 In 
fact, local governments and private developers regularly develop in-
centives to attract the services and attention of one another.84 The 
                                                                                                                      
78 See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Afflu-
ence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 6 (2006) [hereinafter 
McFarlane, New Inner City]. McFarlane states: 
The current market for inner city space coincides quite evenly with a decades-
old policy of cities trying to attract the upper-middle class to the city. Argua-
bly, the discovery has been partially fostered and guided by the deliberate in-
tervention of state and local governments through an explicit and pointed 
policy to attract affluent residents. This intervention by state and local gov-
ernments has taken many forms: incentives to urban professionals to locate in 
certain neighborhoods such as first-time homebuyers programs, settlement 
cost forgiveness programs, other incentive grants and loans for purchasing 
residential real estate within the city, and favorable re-zonings of industrial 
property to facilitate residential occupancy. 
Id. 
79 See James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning 
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. 
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 45, 61 (2002–03) (discussing developer-created movements toward ur-
ban revitalization: “The young and old are attracted to New Urbanist communities, and 
developers are attracted to what could result in better communities, urban revitalization, 
and higher profits from increased density”). 
80 See Sheila R. Foster, From Harlem to Havana: Sustainable Urban Development, 16 Tul. 
Envtl. L.J. 783, 783–84 (2003) (discussing the move of capital and economic opportunity 
back into urban areas). 
81 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 353–54 (1990) [hereinafter 
Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence]. 
82See generally id. at 351–92 (chapter discussing an economic approach to law). 
83 See Pritchett, supra note 58, at 29–30 (discussing the government’s use of eminent 
domain coupled with redevelopment incentives to encourage private investment). 
84 See Urban Planning Comm., Bring New Orleans Back Comm’n, Action Plan 
for New Orleans: The New American City (2006), http://www.npr.org/documents/ 
2006/jan/CityPlanningFinalReport.pdf (illustrating the traditional interdependence exist-
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quid pro quo relationship between private developers and city offi-
cials is illustrated in the following: 
Cities aid in redevelopment by entering into public-private 
partnerships to write down land acquisition and development 
costs by using regulatory freezes and eminent domain power, 
and by providing a number of business incentives to compa-
nies willing to relocate and participate in residential and 
commercial (entertainment and retail) development projects. 
This is done with geographically targeted commercial tax in-
centives such as enterprise zones, creative financing tech-
niques such as tax increment financing, favorable taxing poli-
cies such as under-assessment of commercial property values, 
or even the waiver of taxes through nominal payments-in-lieu-
of-taxes (PILOTS).85 
In these examples, developers and city officials maximize their satis-
faction by finding common points of interest.86 In the last example, 
the converging interest between the city officials and the private de-
velopers was the desire to attract lucrative business to the particular 
neighborhood.87 In light of that common interest, private developers 
and city officials had great incentives to collaborate.88 Each party 
                                                                                                                      
ing between cities and private developers through the stated goal for proposed New Or-
leans redevelopment plans to “[i]dentify and facilitate financially responsible developers 
to develop large numbers of houses quickly in Target Development Areas”). 
85 McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 7. See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, Pre-
serving Community in the City: Special Improvement Districts and the Privatization of Urban Racial-
ized Space, Stanford Agora: Online J. Legal Persp. 2003, http://agora.stanford.edu/ 
agora/volume4/articles/mcfarlane/mcfarlane.pdf (discussing Business Improvement Dis-
tricts as used by developers to further segregate affluent neighborhoods from poor, minority 
ones). 
86 See McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 6–7, 15–17. 
87 See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-Resident 
Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 37, 39 (2006) (“Around the 
United States, cities are being remade through increasingly intricate and opaque ‘pub-
lic/private partnerships’ (‘PPPs’), by which local government agencies trade essential in-
frastructure at low or no cost in exchange for a profit-sharing stake or other return on the 
city’s investment.”); McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 15–17. 
88 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 40. Bezdek states: 
Today’s public/private cooperation has its origins in the first federal revitaliza-
tion programs. Congress designed its redevelopment programs to be federally 
funded and driven, but implemented at the local level. Passage of the Housing 
Act of 1949 was secured by an amalgamation of disparate interests who saw what 
they wanted to see in the program. More specifically, “[h]ousing advocates 
thought it would result in additional affordable housing, while developers saw it 
as an economic opportunity.” Local jurisdictions realized it would give them the 
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could use their status to place the other in a better position.89 City 
officials use eminent domain to acquire needed property and private 
developers acquire funding to implement development plans.90 In the 
context of urban renewal, it is clear that the perennial “invisible 
hand” described by Judge Posner, traditionally believed to be at play 
in all market transactions, cannot be relied on to redress all inequi-
ties.91 
 In a society where supply and demand provide a major motivation, 
economically marginalized individuals lack bargaining power.92 They 
are consequently unable to participate in the market and become un-
fortunate casualties.93 As a result, economically marginalized individu-
als have fewer ways to maximize their interests.94 Taking these limita-
tions into consideration, how then do we proceed to include the 
interests of the nonmarket participants—those economically incapable 
of participating—in order to prevent their marginalization? Judge Pos-
ner concedes that nonmonetary and intangible incentives can be a 
considerable force in the market and that they can create palpable 
shifts in the conduct of business.95 The concerns generated by the post-
Hurricane Katrina redevelopment efforts encapsulate the potential ef-
fects of nonmonetary incentives in redevelopment cases.96 The dis-
placement faced by many of the hurricane victims is an example of 
what can happen when the interests of nonmarket participants are 
                                                                                                                      
tools to clear away blighted eyesores and to build preferred developments in 
their place with the Federal Treasury footing the bill. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitaliz-
ing the Central City With Resident Control, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 689, 700 (1994)). 
89 See id. at 40–41. 
90 See id. 
91 See Elisabeth Krecké, Economic Analysis and Legal Pragmatism, 23 Int'l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 421, 427 (2003) (describing Judge Posner’s assertion that an invisible hand “drives 
the law toward efficiency”). 
92 See generally Robert E. Prasch, Toward a “General Theory” of Market Exchange, 29 J. Econ. 
Issues 807 (1995). Prasch questions “the presumed homogeneity of rational economic ac-
tors.” Id. at 808. 
93 See McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 24–25; Kit Sims Taylor, Human Soci-
ety and the Global Economy ch. 15, http://distance-ed.bcc.ctc.edu/econ100/ksttext/ 
keynes/keynes.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2007) (discussing Keynes’ criticisms of neoclassical 
economists’ tendency to rely on market-based assumptions). 
94 See Fullilove, supra note 5, at 11–17. 
95 Id.; see Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence, supra note 81, at 354. Posner asserts 
that “nonmonetary as well as monetary satisfactions enter into the individual’s calculus of 
maximizing.” Id. 
96 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 38–39 (“The victims least able to escape [Hurricane 
Katrina] and last to be remembered in emergency planning and evacuation were pre-
dominantly poor, black, elderly, and disabled.”). 
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overlooked.97 The redevelopment issues facing post-Hurricane Katrina 
New Orleans should not be viewed as exceptions to the issues usually 
present in urban renewal projects.98 The underlying threat of exclud-
ing disenfranchised individuals is integral to urban renewal, and palpa-
ble in post-Hurricane Katrina redevelopment efforts.99 It is commonly 
the case, however, that marginalized individuals are overlooked when 
points of interest convergence are not identified.100 
 Rather than exhaust efforts to change individuals’ motivations, it is 
useful to investigate how to capitalize on merged interests. While self-
motivated actions are arguably the ideal form of altruism, it is probably 
more realistic and, perhaps more productive, for advocates of eco-
nomically marginalized individuals to concentrate post-Brown strategic 
energy on providing utilitarian incentives for change.101 If we are to 
                                                                                                                      
97 Id. 
98 See generally Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Resi-
dency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. Third World L.J. 325 
(2007) (discussing the overall effects of revitalization generally and in post-Katrina New 
Orleans). 
99 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 40–41. Bezdek states: 
Over the years, much redevelopment has been sharply criticized for its dis-
placement of the poor people who lived where local officials yearned to re-
build. The irony is that the plain purpose of the first national Housing Act 
was displacement of the poor. The Act required that redevelopment occur in 
a “‘slum area or a deteriorated or deteriorating area which is predominantly 
residential in character,’” but did not require that any demolished housing be 
replaced. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Quinones, supra note 88, at 700 (quoting the Act)). 
100 See Inniss, supra note 98, at 357–58, (discussing the effect on marginalized individu-
als when the greater community is distanced by the differences in their identities, and fails 
to find a common interest in protecting those disenfranchised citizens). Inniss states: 
These identities may be based on a variety of factors such as race, ethnicity, or 
religion, any one of which may effectively serve as “identity cleavages.” Iden-
tity cleavages sever members of the differentiated group from the dominant 
group in a society. When these persons also happen to be members of a mar-
ginalized or disfavored group already in conflict with the dominant group, 
the rights of citizenship are rarely fully available to them during a crisis of 
displacement. In such a case, displaced persons are not “protected and as-
sisted” as mainstream citizens during a crisis, but instead are “identified as 
part of the enemy, neglected and even persecuted.” 
Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Francis M. Deng, Divided Nations: The Paradox of 
National Protection, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Jan. 2006, at 217, 219). 
101 See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: Deducting Ear-
marked Transfers to Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1243, 1291 (2002) (discussing the donative theory of Professors Hall and Colombo). 
“Hall and Colombo recognize that under economic theory, giving is never truly altruistic 
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remain true to the legal realism that forms the basis of the Interest 
Convergence Theory, it is unlikely that social change will result solely 
from the sheer good will of people.102 Consequently, it might be more 
effective to focus on strategies that maximize incentives for these 
changes to occur. 
 Economic strategizing has been used in other spheres to explain 
or to affect market forces.103 Recently, for example, many companies 
changed their hiring practices through interest convergence.104 For 
                                                                                                                      
(i.e., completely selfless) because giving occurs only if some positive or negative incentive 
impels the donor to give.” Id. 
102 See R. H. Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J.L. & Econ. 529 (1976), reprinted in 
Emma Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris, Economic Justice: Race, Gender, Iden-
tity and Economics 144–45 (2005) (discussing Adam Smith’s view on the dangers of 
relying on benevolence alone as a source of change). Coase states: “The great advantage of 
the market is that it is able to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness and 
partiality of benevolence, so that those who are unknown, unattractive, or unimportant, 
will have their wants served.” Id. 
103 See Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity 
Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What To Do About It, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1583, 1596–97 
(2004). Ramirez states: 
[E]conomic theory can nevertheless help explain the strategic behavior of 
CEOs in this context. Game theory suggests that much behavior can be ex-
plained by substituting strategic behavior (where actors have knowledge of 
and are influenced by the expected behavior of others) for mere rational 
maximization in the context of impersonal markets. This strategic behavior is 
a function of each actor’s expected payoffs, determined in light of the ex-
pected behavior of other actors. A fundamental heuristic of game theory is 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates how two parties 
striving to maximize their payoffs will conduct themselves in a way that may 
not maximize their joint welfare, once they take into account the behavior of 
others. Assume two individuals are in custody for suspicion of a crime. If they 
cooperate and agree not to testify against each other, they would serve two-
year sentences as the result of a plea bargain. If one confesses and testifies 
against the other at trial, the confessor will receive a one-year sentence, and 
the other will receive a ten-year sentence. If both confess, they will receive 
sentences of five years. Obviously, the best option is for neither to confess, for 
they would then only serve a combined four years. Nevertheless, if they do 
not know what the other will do, they are each best served by confessing, 
which eliminates the worst outcome and creates an opportunity for the con-
fessor to serve only one year. If both do this, which they rationally may, they 
jointly serve ten years instead of four. Simply stated, their strategic behavior 
will prevent both from rationally maximizing their utility. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) 
104 See Angela Brouse, Comment, The Latest Call for Diversity in Law Firms: Is It Legal?, 75 
UMKC L. Rev. 847, 850–52 (2007) (discussing the converging interests that are prompting 
law firms to create a diverse work environment). Brouse states: 
 It is generally accepted that diversity promotes equal opportunity and so-
cial justice in the world of employment. “Many corporate executives and hu-
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these companies, diversity became a business decision because several 
of their consumers and clients were people of color.105 Continued 
growth meant hiring and promoting traditionally underrepresented 
persons.106 From the consumers and clients’ perspectives, they would 
only support businesses with a diverse workforce.107 Many of the con-
sumers and clients had a vested interest in diverse workforces because 
they were people of color themselves.108 Others had a social interest—
perhaps a business interest—in doing business with companies con-
cerned with diversity.109 Therefore, a common interest in diversity is 
forged between companies and their consumers and clients.110 
 Tax deductible donation is another form of interest convergence. 
Institutions often seek large donations from individuals or companies 
                                                                                                                      
man relations managers are motivated by a desire to do right (and perhaps by 
a desire to be seen as doing right) in giving an edge to individuals from 
groups long marginalized and excluded from positions of authority and privi-
lege in society.” 
Id. at 850–51 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cynthia Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, 
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 7 
(2005)). 
105 See id. at 848–50 (discussing how clients pressure law firms to staff minority attor-
neys on the clients’ matters). 
106 See David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good For 
Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1548, 1576 (2004) (discussing the importance of creating a diverse 
workplace). Wilkins quotes General Motors’s amicus brief in Grutter v. Bollinger, which 
notes that “cross-cultural competence”: 
“[A]ffects a business' performance of virtually all of its major tasks: (a) identi-
fying and satisfying the needs of diverse customers; (b) recruiting and retain-
ing a diverse work force, and inspiring that work force to work together to de-
velop and implement innovative ideas; and (c) forming and fostering 
productive working relationships with business partners and subsidiaries 
around the globe.” 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at 12–13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 224 (2003) (No. 02-516), available at http://www.umich.edu/ 
~urel/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/um/GM-both.pdf). 
107 See id. 
108 See generally Kelly McMurry, Balancing the Scales: Small Firms Seek Diversity, Trial, Jan. 
1998, at 12, available at 34-JAN Trial 12 (Westlaw) (discussing moves toward diversity in a 
legal context where one firm partner is a black male and the other a white female, and 
both the positive and negative effects that their diverse workplace has had with diverse 
clients). 
109 See id. at 12 (McMurry quotes Margaret Lack, a Vice President and diversity facilita-
tor with Career Partners, International/The Chesapeake Group, in McLean, Virginia, 
stating: “‘[D]iverse clients want diverse lawyers representing them’”). 
110 See Brouse, supra note 104, at 850–52; Wilkins, supra note 106, at 1576; McMurry, 
supra note 108, at 12. 
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in exchange for both tax deductions and social or public recognition 
for the donor.111 For example, universities regularly name buildings 
after their benefactors who also get to deduct the donation from their 
taxes, in addition to having their names on an edifice.112 Such 
exchanges are mutually beneficial to both parties because they have 
found ways to bring together disparate or previously unknown interests. 
The institutions amass the donations they need to complete a beneficial 
project while the benefactors receive social or public recognition for 
their altruism.113 
 The foregoing examples are analytically useful for post-Hurricane 
Katrina redevelopment projects in New Orleans. Through interest con-
vergence, these examples are paradigmatically useful in bringing to-
gether traditionally conflicting interests and protecting disadvantaged 
persons.114 
 The redemptive power of interest convergence already manifested 
itself after Kelo v. City of New London. Following public uproar against 
the Kelo decision, local legislators have enacted legislation attempting 
to counter and limit its impact.115 Some states have reacted to Kelo by 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Dean Pappas, Note, The Independent Sector and the Tax Law: Defining Charity in an 
Ideal Democracy, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 461, 471 n.40 (1991). Pappas states: 
Professor Bittker notes that according to statistical studies “rich taxpayers 
contribute heavily to private colleges and universities [whose students] are 
likely to be drawn . . . from families with less income than their benefactors. 
[Also] gifts to community chests, the Red Cross, hospitals and similar social 
welfare agencies probably generate an even greater degree of redistribution.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions 
or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 56 (1972)). 
112 See Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights and the Physical Public Domain, 
40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 919, 947–49, 953 (2007). 
113 See id. at 947–49 (discussing the ease with which an institution will give a benefactor 
public recognition when his or her donations are sizeable). Bartow states an example: 
“Senator Mitch McConnell steered $14.2 million in federal funding toward the University 
of Louisville to build a new library wing, the university magnanimously named the new 
auditorium after U.S. Labor Secretary Elaine Chao, McConnell's wife.” Id. at 947. 
114 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology 
Through Interest Convergence, 79 St. John's L. Rev. 253, 278–79 (2005) (discussing the power 
that minorities wield against the conflicting interests of the greater community when their 
collective interests are either represented by organized coalitions or they have political 
power). The ongoing debate triggered by Kelo renders this a ripe time to re-evaluate im-
plementation of renewal projects. See Andrew Schouten, Recent Development, Clear as 
Mud: Chapter 98 and California's Community Redevelopment Law, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 216, 
226 (2007) (noting that five policy committees in the California Legislature held joint 
hearings on redevelopment reform proposals in 2005, in response to concerns over Kelo). 
115 See Will Lovell, Note, The Kelo Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain Stat-
utes and Past Blight Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense Mechanism for All Non-Affluent and Mi-
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prohibiting the use of eminent domain when the property is to be 
transferred to private parties.116 Others have specified that eminent 
domain should be restricted to blighted communities.117 Nationwide, 
activists across the political spectrum have joined together to share 
concerns about the impact of Kelo.118 The collaboration has provided a 
space for the activists to find a common ground for the protection of 
property rights and fear of abuse of power by the state.119 
                                                                                                                      
nority Property Owners, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 609, 610–11 (2007). Referring to public reaction to 
Kelo, Lovell notes: 
To . . . property owners, their government had betrayed them by authorizing 
governments to take their own homes and businesses and transfer that very 
same property to private developers under the guise of “economic develop-
ment.” Following a strong public reaction after Kelo, state legislatures began 
to enact new laws to tighten the restrictions against such abuses. 
Id. at 610. 
116 See id. at 616–17 (detailing the reaction to Kelo as one that successfully pushed for 
legislation that would restrict the government’s ability to take private property for private 
development). 
117 See id. at 619–22 (discussing the restrictions adopted by many states that allowed the 
taking of private property for private development, only if the property taken was 
blighted). 
118 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 38 (comparing the perceived pre-Kelo apathy towards 
individuals displaced by urban renewal to “the outrage that followed the Supreme Court’s 
Kelo v. City of New London decision” (footnote omitted)). 
119 See Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City Of New London: Eminent Do-
main, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. Legis. 165, 166–67 (2006) (noting that the-
desire to find a means to protect property interests has been a common thread among 
Americans). Bell states: 
 Reaction to the Court's decision has been swift and sharp. Opinion polls 
have shown a public sharply critical of the decision. Many states have enacted 
or are considering legislation restricting the use of eminent domain for eco-
nomic revitalization. Several states have created commissions to study the use 
of eminent domain for economic redevelopment. Indeed, legislation restrict-
ing the use of eminent domain for economic development has even been 
considered in Connecticut, the state from which Kelo arose. On the federal 
level, the United States House of Representatives almost immediately passed 
both a resolution of disapproval and an appropriations rider prohibiting the 
use of funds to enforce the decision. Both the House and the Senate have in-
troduced legislation to reverse Kelo. Indeed, the decision seems to have 
united members of Congress from across the political spectrum, including, 
for example, conservative former Republican House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay and liberal Democrat Representatives John Conyers and Barney Frank. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Redefining Public Purpose 
 A mere interest in protecting traditionally recognized property 
rights is insufficient to address the needs of people marginalized by in-
equitable urban renewal plans.120 In addition, such a narrow view con-
sistently undervalues the nonpecuniary investments that all individuals 
make in a community.121 The displacement of the poor members of 
redeveloped communities still remains a problem.122 Those displaced 
range from individuals whose houses are destroyed in anticipation of 
the redevelopment—if public housing—to those who have unequal 
bargaining power with the city and developers and are subsequently 
forced to sell their property below fair-market value.123 Others, unable 
to afford the rent in the newly developed neighborhoods, are forced to 
find lodging in more remote neighborhoods or even in other cities or 
states.124 
 We can equitably implement urban renewal plans by redefining 
public purpose.125 As discussed above, an adequate definition of public 
purpose should include protecting poor residents and preventing their 
displacement.126 
 While the majority in Kelo contends that “the achievement of a 
public good often coincides with the immediate benefiting of private 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Keasha Broussard, Note, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban Revitaliza-
tion Against the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 Law & Psychol. Rev. 99, 107–12 (2000) 
(discussing the “human costs” of urban revitalization and the effects on those displaced by 
redevelopment). 
121 See id. at 104–06 (discussing the psychological effects of “revitalization” on displaced 
residents). 
122 See id. 
123 See Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement: New York City in 
the 1990s, 70 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 39, 50 (2004). The authors note: 
[D]isadvantaged households who wish to move into these neighborhoods may 
not be able to find an affordable unit, as may disadvantaged households in 
gentrifying neighborhoods who wish to move within their neighborhood. 
Moreover, if gentrification occurs on a sufficiently wide scale, it could result 
in a gradual shrinking of the pool of low-cost housing available in a metro-
politan area. 
Id. 
124 See id. 
125 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
126 See Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 
33 Pepp. L. Rev. 335, 365–67 (2006) (arguing that the present definition of public use is so 
broad that it may apply to any private “profit-making” use, but nonetheless does not en-
compass the needs of those that may fall victim to urban revitalization due to the fact that 
the process of “urban redevelopment has been one of discrimination against, and oppres-
sion of, politically powerless urban ethnic and economic minorities”). 
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parties,”127 the reality still remains that the interests of the public of-
ten conflict with the interests of private developers.128 As it stands, the 
current application of the public purpose standard is so broad that it 
is subject to manipulation.129 A redefinition of public purpose should 
include a protection against displacement of economically marginal-
ized individuals. 
 In order to test whether a redefined public purpose has been ap-
plied, the following factors should be considered. First, whether de-
velopers and decisionmakers maximized the intangible value and con-
tribution created by the social capital present in the preblighted 
community and took specific steps to preserve the human capital-
based value. Social capital has been defined as “the ways in which in-
dividuals and communities create trust, maintain social networks, and 
establish norms that enable participants to act cooperatively toward 
the pursuit of shared goals.”130 The capacity for social capital to pro-
vide, then add, an invaluable quality to a neighborhood is described 
                                                                                                                      
127 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 n.14. 
128 See Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, The Houses that Eminent Domain and 
Housing Tax Credits Built: Imagining a Better New Orleans, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 689, 699 
(2007). The authors note the often opposing views of private developers and the public: 
“[T]here are two seemingly opposing points of view about how to rebuild de-
stroyed communities. On one hand, urban planners, real estate developers 
and architects tend to see solutions mainly in terms of demolition and large-
scale redevelopment projects. On the other hand, property owners look at 
the wreckage . . . and ask, ‘How can I fix this?’” 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peter Werwath, Two Paradigms for Renewal: Development 
Versus Property Owner Empowerment, Report from the ACORN Community Forum on Rebuilding 
New Orleans, Soc. Pol’y, Winter 2005–06, at 12, available at http://www.socialpolicy.org/ 
index.php?id=1640). 
129 See Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 
Urb. Law. 201, 203 (2006). Kanner notes: 
Kelo has inspired a widespread and vigorous reaction by the public and press 
primarily because it is a case of reductio ad absurdum, meaning that its premise 
is flawed in that it deems almost everything to be a “public use.” So long as de-
velopers and municipal functionaries predict that more money will be made 
from the subject property in the redevelopers’ hands than its present owner’s 
then the “public use” requirement is said to be met. This amounts to a sort of 
municipal do-it-yourself constitutional imprimatur because all the condemn-
ing municipality needs to do now is proffer self-manufactured plans for the 
proposed taking, even though . . . condemnors are not obliged to carry out 
their plans and are free to engage in intrinsic fraud to take private property 
but then not use it as planned. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
130 Foster, supra note 12, at 529. 
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as a community’s purchasing power.131 Second, whether the commu-
nity’s input was solicited and considered during the planning of the 
renewed neighborhood.132 Forms of community participation should 
include the election of community-based unions133 to the renewal 
planning team with full voting powers and a mandate that all deci-
sions be made only after full transparent disclosure to the community 
residents. Third, whether the prevention of displacement was one of 
the stated goals of the renewal plans and whether specific and con-
crete steps were taken to prevent the displacement of low-income 
residents. If, as stated in Berman v. Parker, public purpose can repre-
sent values that are “spiritual as well as physical,”134 intangibles such as 
social capital,135 the prevention of displacement, and mandatory 
community involvement are all values that should be reflected in any 
definition of what constitutes appropriate use of property for public 
purpose under the Fifth Amendment. 
 Nondisplacement can be achieved by offering incentives for de-
velopers and city officials to work together to craft protections for vul-
nerable members of society in addition to their other goals.136 One 
manner in which incentives can be created is to organize a bottom-up 
movement where citizens put pressure on local officials through grass-
roots organizations.137 A bottom-up movement can serve as a check on 
                                                                                                                      
131 Id. at 543. 
132 The Environmental Justice Small Grants Program provides financial assistance to 
eligible organizations to build collaborative partnerships, to identify the local environ-
mental and/or public health issues, and to envision solutions and empower the commu-
nity through education, training, and outreach. City officials and urban developers could 
also work in conjunction with grassroots community organizations to avail themselves of 
the support and organizational framework that this program provides. 
133 See Maia Sophia Campbell, Note, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Political Participa-
tion and the Case of YATAMA v. Nicaragua, 24 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 499, 513–22 (2007). 
134 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
135 Social capital refers to the value that the intangible contributions of individuals 
such as cooperation, camaraderie, and a sense of unity, add to a particular community. See 
Foster, supra note 12, at 529–31. This idea is explored in further detail at the end of this 
Part. 
136 See Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own Ad-
vice, 59 SMU L. Rev. 345, 380–81 (2006) (describing similar incentives to motivate devel-
opers to participate in “‘combating urban sprawl’” (quoting James E. Holloway & Donald 
C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets, and the Qual-
ity of Life Under the Takings and Other Provisions, 9 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 421, 455–56 
(2001))). 
137 See id. at 381 (describing the smart growth movement that has been endorsed by 
the American Planning Association). Though Eagle notes that the success of the smart 
growth movement will not be apparent for some time, a similar movement may prove 
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city officials who, in turn, will have to include the community’s interests 
in their negotiations with developers.138 The private developers, need-
ing support from city officials for licenses and land acquisition, will 
have an incentive to cooperate with the city and the public’s wishes.139 
As a result, the interests of city officials, private developers, and the 
public can all converge.140 
 This convergence of interests is being played out in the redevel-
opment of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.141 The redevelop-
ment plan exposed the inadequacy of the present public purpose doc-
trine and a need for redefinition.142 The local government issued its 
initial plan for redevelopment and received nationwide criticisms.143 In 
the past year, it has become clear that solutions that exclude the masses 
of displaced individuals will not be tolerated locally or nationally.144 
 New Orleans provides a perfect example of how a traditional ap-
plication of public purpose can disenfranchise large numbers of indi-
                                                                                                                      
beneficial in motivating developers to consider poor residents in revitalization schemes. See 
id. 
138 See id. (describing smart growth, a similar program concerning urban sprawl). 
139 See Mark W. Zimmerman, Note, Opening the Door to Race-Based Real Estate Marketing: 
South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 41 DePaul 
L. Rev. 1271, 1301–02 (1992) (noting a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deci-
sion in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), 
where the City would deny building permits in certain areas in order to force developers to 
build in urban renewal areas, the Court held that the City could accomplish its goals by 
adopting incentives for developers). 
140 See Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and Affordable Hous-
ing, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 841, 862–64 (2006). 
141 See Brown & Williams, supra note 128, at 701–02 (“Presently, most of the housing 
policy efforts by federal, state, and local actors have focused on owner-occupied housing 
needs, leaving many concerned that rental housing and renters will not receive adequate 
consideration in the rebuilding process.”). 
142 See Parlow, supra note 140, at 860–64 (noting the marginalization caused by the cur-
rent definition of public use of those who are at the mercy of the government for afford-
able housing). 
143 See Joel Horwich et al., Ctr. for Am. Progress, Rebuilding Homes and Lives: 
Progressive Options for Housing Policy Post-Katrina 4 (2005), available at http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4–9A2B-43C7-A521–5D6FF2E06E03%7D/ 
housing_brief.pdf (“The Bush administration initially proposed concentrating displaced 
families in large trailer parks, an approach that met considerable criticism from commen-
tators across the political spectrum.”). 
144 See id.; Steve Joyce ed., Many New Orleans Residents Uneasy About Redevelopment Plan Un-
veiled by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, Building Online eUpdate, Jan. 12, 2006, 
http://www.buildingonline.com/news/viewnews.pl?id=4797&subcategory=295; WDSU New 
Orleans, Commission: New Orleans Will Be Different, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.wdsu.com/news/ 
5981417/detail.html (“Greeted by a round of boos, Joe Cannizaro, the man charged with 
laying out a new blueprint of New Orleans, unveiled the committee's vision.”). 
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viduals.145 Justice Thomas addressed the potential negative effects of 
Kelo’s definition of public purpose in his dissenting opinion.146 He ar-
gued: 
 The consequences of today’s decision are not difficult to 
predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called “urban re-
newal” programs provide some compensation for the prop-
erties they take, but no compensation is possible for the sub-
jective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and 
the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. 
Allowing the government to take property solely for public 
purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public 
purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal 
guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on 
poor communities. . . . If ever there were justification for in-
trusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that pro-
tect “discrete and insular minorities,” . . . surely that princi-
ple would apply with great force to the powerless groups and 
individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential 
standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use Clause is 
therefore deeply perverse. It encourages “those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political proc-
ess, including large corporations and development firms,” to 
victimize the weak.147 
The rebuilding of New Orleans should force governmental entities to 
determine how to balance their economic interests and the needs of 
the poor populations in the areas subject to redevelopment. Kelo ex-
                                                                                                                      
145 See Brown & Williams, supra note 128, at 701–02. Providing an example of the ineq-
uity that may result from the use of an overly broad definition of public use, Brown and 
Williams state: 
 The Urban Land Institute has recommended that New Orleans delay re-
developing many of the most severely impacted areas of the City. Some Afri-
can-American leaders object to the Institute's recommendation and are con-
cerned that the minority neighborhoods could be negatively impacted in a 
disproportionate manner by condemnation and, relatedly, eminent domain. 
If residents are discouraged by these prospects of long-term displacement, 
they may be more inclined to sell land to speculators at suppressed prices 
and, in so doing, miss out on the actual condemnation of their property. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
146 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
147 Id. (citations omitted). 
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tends public purpose beyond the broad scope contemplated by the 
Berman Court.148 While Berman conceded that public purpose was not 
limited to a strict public use only, Berman did not stretch public pur-
pose to allow transfer to another private interest.149 Kelo’s extension of 
public purpose has some redeeming potentials.150 It gives cities the 
flexibility to decide how to carry out the interests of all members of 
the community.151 City decisions that impose substantial burdens on 
some members of the community should fall outside of what should 
be considered public good. 
 A consideration of what constitutes public purpose is incomplete 
without computing the intangible investments that people make in 
their communities.152 
For some, the newly restructured city is the fulfillment of the 
post-modern American dream: a post-industrial, culturally 
hybrid aesthetic that covets urban life while implicitly reject-
ing some of its “grittier” aspects (read: diversity and certain 
inconveniences). For others, the restructuring signals a wel-
come change in community character from declining and 
impoverished to popular and affluent. All recognize that af-
fluent people bring business and government attention and 
improved services to their neighborhoods. On the other 
hand, the changes are also viewed with a sense of foreboding 
as residents who have experienced displacement or under-
stand that rising rents will force them out and change the 
complexion of the neighborhood hold their breath or worry. 
Worse, the changes signal ominously that the residents’ de-
parture from the community is imminent.153 
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. at 484–85 (majority opinion). 
149 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954). 
150 See J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities Under the Tak-
ings Clause, 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 131, 153–56 (2005). 
151 See id. (discussing at length the necessity of a city’s ability to exercise eminent do-
main without great difficulty, in order to effect changes that benefit both the wealthy and 
the poor). 
152 See Broussard, supra note 120, at 104–11 (discussing the failure of cities and devel-
opers to consider the emotional ties that displaced residents have with their homes and 
the nonmonetary investments that many residents have made in their homes and commu-
nities). 
153 McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note78, at 5. McFarlane states: 
Although many old central cities continue to experience overall population 
loss from the now decades-old middle and upper-middle class exodus to the 
suburbs, the loss masks a dramatic, yet paradoxical, counter-trend. Since the 
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The displacement of former residents triggers a loss for those displaced 
as well as for the neighborhood at large.154 Individuals invest their time 
and energy into shaping the identity of their particular geographic ar-
eas.155 These investments create an intangible value that renders the 
area more attractive to residents and nonresidents alike.156 This intan-
gible quality is, as previously stated, referred to as social capital.157 Pur-
                                                                                                                      
late 1960’s and 1970’s, the number of upper-income professionals in centrally 
located inner city neighborhoods, usually accessible from, if not close to, cen-
tral business districts, has been slowly increasing as succeeding waves of urban 
middle class people are willing to breach the boundaries of the formerly ta-
boo “inner city.” The nature and pace of such repopulation during each pe-
riod has varied, but the common characteristic has been the ongoing recon-
figuration of the central city as a space for the affluent. As the single yuppie, 
the childless couple, and the empty nester in search of a newly valuable way of 
life continue to “discover” and claim new territory within the city, they are 
part of a complex process that is causing the transformation of urban space to 
suit their social needs and consumption tastes. Urban places that were once 
racialized as Black and classified as poor, dangerous, and off-limits to anyone 
of affluence and with choices, have taken on new meaning today. These 
places are now suppliers of housing that is relatively cheap, centrally located, 
and often architecturally rich. They are open territories for investment specu-
lators, redevelopment agencies, and affluent professionals who reject the 
suburban form of living, but demand, and can easily pay for, luxury residen-
tial, commercial retail, entertainment, and other intangible spatial amenities. 
Id. at 3–5 (footnotes omitted). 
154 See Fullilove, supra note 5, at 14. 
155 See id. at 10–11. 
156 See McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 30–31. “‘[W]hen a household leaves 
a neighborhood through displacement, it misses out on the opportunity to share in the 
social and economic improvements the neighborhood might enjoy in future generations. 
Moreover, those future generations in the neighborhood miss out on the history and 
grounding those residents might have provided.’” Id. at 31 (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, The Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Urban and 
Metro. Policy, Dealing With Neighborhood Change: A Primer on Gentrification 
and Policy Choices 17 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/gentri- 
fication/gentrification.pdf). 
157 See Foster, supra note 12, at 529–31 (illustrating how urban renewal often dimin-
ishes the social capital of a neighborhood). Foster states: 
 Strong social networks can produce significant economic and social welfare 
gains for geographically defined communities, as numerous studies have docu-
mented. This capital can also be enhanced or diminished by land use and de-
velopment decisions. Some decades ago the critic of modern urban planning, 
Jane Jacobs, famously stood up (at least intellectually) to urban renewers in pro-
test because they were destroying the “irreplaceable social capital” which consti-
tutes the lifeblood of cities. She described this “social capital” as comprising the 
web of relationships and cooperative action between people who share a geo-
graphic space in big cities and/or an interest in maintaining a healthy 
neighborhood. What emerges from these relationships over time are estab-
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chasing power is the capacity for social capital to provide an invaluable 
quality to a neighborhood.158 Social capital can: 
[B]e a critical resource in urban communities, especially in 
large cities where people can lead fairly atomized lives and in 
vulnerable neighborhoods where residents can only meet their 
economic and social needs through cooperation with others. 
Thus, where a community has sufficient amounts of social capi-
tal it can also “purchase” many other social (and economic) re-
sources that create and sustain healthy neighborhoods and, ul-
timately, healthy cities.159 
Characteristics like collective cooperation, shared goals, and shared 
values make up many poor communities’ social capital.160 When re-
newal plans are implemented, community members are dispersed, and 
                                                                                                                      
lished networks of “small-scale, everyday public life and thus of trust and social 
control” necessary to the “self-governance” of urban neighborhoods. 
 Cities are thus constituted of neighborhoods and communities which 
come to manage themselves via networks of interested individuals who build 
and strengthen working relationships over time through trust and voluntary 
cooperation. This social capital is the “civic fauna” of urbanism, making the 
successful governance of cities possible. Once this social capital is lost, Jacobs 
argued, “the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new 
capital is slowly and chancily accumulated.” 
Id. at 530–31 (footnotes omitted). 
158 See id. at 543. 
159 Id. at 543. Foster uses studies conducted by sociologist Eric Klinenberg comparing: 
[H]ow two very similar adjacent Chicago neighborhoods, one African-American 
and one Latino, of roughly equal size fared in one week of extremely hot weather 
in Chicago in July 1995 that left over 700 dead. The two neighborhoods, North 
Lawndale and Little Village, had similar numbers and proportions of senior citi-
zens living alone and in poverty. Yet the two communities experienced very dif-
ferent outcomes during the heat wave: while North Lawndale endured nineteen 
fatalities, Little Village suffered only three deaths. Klinenberg illustrates how the 
vibrant street life and plentiful commercial activity of Little Village contributed to 
the safety of the elderly residents who matched the general profile of heat wave 
victims. Not only were low-income senior citizens in Little Village more likely to 
receive visits from concerned friends and neighbors than their counterparts in 
North Lawndale, even those seniors without social networks were more likely to 
venture out to air-conditioned stores or other public places, thanks to the busy 
streets and a greater sense of safety. In North Lawndale, by contrast, the rampant 
crime, proliferation of vacant lots and abandoned buildings—and general ab-
sence of any activities indicating a functional, safe community—imposed upon 
area seniors the brutal choice between staying inside to face the heat alone or go-
ing out to risk intimidation, robbery, or worse. 
Id. at 543–44 (footnotes omitted). 
160 Foster, supra note 12, at 542–43, 569–70. 
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these intangible valuables completely disappear.161 Currently, the pres-
ervation of a neighborhood’s social capital is not computed into devel-
opers’ equations when making renewal decisions.162 The displacement 
from renewed neighborhoods, consequently, causes a reduction in the 
original value of the neighborhood and emotional trauma to its eco-
nomically displaced former residents.163 
III. Proposal for a More Egalitarian Redevelopment Model 
 While some jurisdictions have attempted to curb the exclusionary 
effects of using eminent domain for private development,164 there still 
remain a number of factors that have inhibited creation of egalitarian 
redevelopment plans.165 Maryland provides a good demonstration of 
the challenges in public land use reform.166 The Maryland Legislature 
created a task force to study the effects of eminent domain on small 
businesses and develop policies to protect small businesses from the 
                                                                                                                      
161 See Fullilove, supra note 5, at 14. 
162 See Foster, supra note 12, at 545–46 (describing the fact that social scientists are now 
realizing that social capital is undervalued). Foster states: 
 Even though many sociologists have traditionally assumed, based in part on 
William Julius Wilson’s work, that poor communities lack adequate social capi-
tal and related resources, contemporary social scientists are beginning to ques-
tion that assumption. Recent scholarship and empirical evidence is beginning 
to illustrate the “ecological fallacy” that equates high levels of poverty with social 
dysfunction and frayed community ties. For instance, a recent study by geogra-
phers at the University of Southern California provides evidence that the land-
scape of concentrated poverty can differ dramatically depending upon place-
specific local and regional forces, as well as broader economic forces. As we see 
increasing levels of differentiation among impoverished communities, we need 
to rethink the equation of low levels of social functionality and capital with pov-
erty. 
Id. at 542–43 (footnotes omitted); see also Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Au-
topsy of Disaster in Chicago 104–05, 116–17 (2002) (demonstrating that a commu-
nity’s reputation as poor and blighted does not mean that it lacks value; such value should 
be maintained when making renewal decisions). 
163 See Fullilove, supra note 5, at 11–12, 14. 
164 See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 346–47 (Md. 2007) 
(holding that the City of Baltimore must prove necessity related to a specified redevelopment 
plan before taking immediate possession of property via a “quick take” condemnation proce-
dure); see also American Planning Association, Eminent Domain 2006 State Legislation, 
http://www.planning.org/legislation/eminentdomain/edlegislation.htm (last visited Dec. 
10, 2007) (providing a survey of state actions regarding eminent domain). 
165 See Audrey G. McFarlane, Redevelopment and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 
22 J.L. & Pol. 33, 45–46 (2006) [hereinafter McFarlane, Redevelopment] (discussing a vari-
ety of factors that perpetuate the class-based nature of land use). 
166 See Kurt J. Fischer & Melissa L. Mackiewicz, Eminent Domain Reform’s Failure in Mary-
land, Md. Bar J., Sept. 2006, at 14, 16. 
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arbitrary use of eminent domain.167 This initiative was prompted by a 
concern that the broad public purpose notion reiterated in Kelo v. City 
of New London does not truly consider the needs of all segments of the 
public.168 At the time the task force was created, Maryland law did not 
provide property owners with compensation for the value of closed 
businesses or lost revenue during transition periods as a result of 
eminent domain.169 The task force was directed to study: 
(1) the concept of business goodwill and whether a business 
owner should be entitled to compensation for loss of good-
will, (2) the feasibility of requiring a condemning authority to 
study the impact of condemnation on businesses in the pro-
posed area where condemnation will occur, and (3) the feasi-
bility of a shorter condemnation process to lessen the uncer-
tainty that the process creates for businesses.170 
The task force was also to outline more generally the conditions that 
must be present before a public entity can attempt eminent domain 
proceedings in Maryland.171 While the task force did not recommend a 
ban on the use of eminent domain to further private development 
plans, it did make some suggestions geared towards protecting small 
businesses.172 Some of the protections suggested included: requiring a 
condemning authority to demonstrate that it considered whether al-
ternative plans might avoid the acquisition of businesses or incorporate 
them in the redevelopment project; compensating business owners for 
lost assets of closed businesses or lost income during periods of busi-
ness interruption as a result of condemnation; and providing reloca-
tion assistance to businesses affected by eminent domain rulings.173 
 Furthermore, recent Maryland cases have limited the govern-
ment’s power to use eminent domain on an emergency basis.174 Despite 
this progress, however, Maryland has not yet amended its rules to pre-
vent use of eminent domain for private development or to mandate the 
nondisplacement of low-income residents.175 A redefinition of public 
                                                                                                                      
167 Id. at 16. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Fischer & Mackiewicz, supra note 166, at 14, 16. 
173 Id. at 16, 22–23. 
174 Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 327 (Md. 2007). 
175 See American Planning Association, supra note 164 (providing a survey of state ac-
tions regarding eminent domain). 
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purpose is especially needed in such a state, in which cities like Balti-
more are undergoing constant renewal.176 
 Other commentators have expressed concern with the broad 
reach of Kelo and have encouraged limiting statutes similar to the ef-
forts made by Maryland.177 However, a number of issues remain to be 
resolved to ensure egalitarian redevelopments.178 As in Maryland, very 
few redevelopment laws address the difficulties that urban renewal 
causes to poor individuals, especially lessees.179 If the need to protect 
small businesses has proved compelling enough to induce legislative 
action, the need to protect low-income communities against the inequi-
table use of eminent domain should be even clearer. The plight of the 
poor was revealed in graphic and disturbing detail in the wake of Hur-
ricane Katrina.180 As a consequence, the post-Katrina era is ripe for ad-
                                                                                                                      
176 See Amanda J. Crawford, Residents Call for Fair Play as Renovation Plan Proceeds; 
Neighbors Voice Concerns About Loss of Homes, Balt. Sun, Aug. 20, 2002, at 3B (public protest 
in regards to Johns Hopkins’s appropriation of property to redevelop the Middle East 
neighborhood of Baltimore). 
177 See Kanner, supra note 129, at 201. Kanner states: 
[Kelo] has precipitated a great deal of controversy. Large numbers of Ameri-
cans were dismayed and angered to find that anyone’s unoffending home 
may be seized and razed to convery the site to a municipally favored redevel-
oper, on the theory that redevelopment will increase revenues and wages, 
thus tending to revitalize the community. Public opinion polls indicate that 
Kelo’s broad reading of the Public Use Clause has left the great majority of 
Americans gasping with disbelief. Kelo has precipitated a flood of proposed 
(and in some cases enacted) legislation to curb this breathtaking expansion 
of unreviewable and unaccountable government power. A strong public reac-
tion to a Supreme Court ruling is hardly a new phenomenon, but in this case 
its intensity and its ability to stir legislatures into immediate corrective action 
are, at least in my experience, unprecedented. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
178 See McFarlane, Redevelopment, supra note 165, at 45–46 (discussing unresolved class 
issues in land use). 
179 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 67–68 (“When the neighborhood converts to owner-
ship property from rental property, or the neighborhood undergoes gentrification, from 
low to moderate income residents to professional and other social elites, the former ten-
ants must find somewhere else to live.”). 
180 See Michèle Alexandre, At the Intersection of Post-911 Immigration Practices and Domestic 
Policies: Can Katrina Serve as a Catalyst for Change?, 26 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 155, 157–59 
(2006). The article states: 
 The events surrounding the Katrina disaster in September 2005 . . . high-
lighted the race/class based hierarchy existing in the United States . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . . Overnight, New Orleans metamorphosed from one of the most cher-
ished cities of the United States to being described as “third world-like,” a 
term which is usually charged with contempt and condescension. Time and 
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vocating for changes that will protect the rights of the poor in redevel-
opment cases. One way to create such change is by showcasing the in-
centives that would convince developers and cities to adopt such 
changes. One such incentive is that the nondisplacement of the poor in 
redevelopment cases can help alleviate the existing racial/economic 
tension in the United States. Since displaced individuals are dispropor-
tionately poor non-Whites, carving out protections for these groups 
sends a message that poor non-Whites and poor individuals are valued 
members of our citizenry. Promoting such value would, in turn, benefit 
the elected officials who sponsor these initiatives. When successful, 
elected officials can benefit from such efforts by garnering the votes of 
members of the poor communities, as well as the votes of others who 
share the same values. 
 While most individuals would probably not have denied the exis-
tence of poverty in America before Hurricane Katrina, few were proba-
bly ready to face the reality of its ugly, nefarious consequences on the 
lives of America’s poor. This reality reinvigorated discourse concerning 
the role of government policy in the creation and alleviation of poverty 
in America. Decisions such as budget cuts for education and Medicaid 
programs have historically adversely impacted the lives of poor Ameri-
cans, without the rest of the country experiencing their disastrous ef-
fects or the complete vulnerability in which poor Americans find them-
selves.181 
 Because of the dynamics produced by Hurricane Katrina, post-
Katrina New Orleans has become the focal point for many advocates of 
equitable urban planning.182 While Hurricane Katrina placed redevel-
opment issues in New Orleans in a unique setting, the underlying issues 
of displacement remain the same.183 
                                                                                                                      
time again commentators marveled that such misery was indeed taking place 
in America. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
181 See Peter Dreier, America’s Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 
1351, 1383–86 (1993) (discussing the disparate impact of federal budget cuts on programs 
designed to assist poor individuals). 
182 See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: In 
Search of a Just Public Housing Policy Post-Katrina, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1263, 1267 (2007) (noting 
that many of the concerns of advocates of fair housing plans stem from the staggering loss 
of affordable housing post-Katrina). 
183 See McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 18–19. As McFarlane points out: 
 Typically this devalued land is in Black and Latino inner city neighbor-
hoods, and to a certain extent, in working class White neighborhoods. The 
difference between the two is that there may be a higher percentage of 
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 Though, in many cities, the areas targeted for renewal are often 
disenfranchised neighborhoods, as indicated earlier, low-income dwell-
ers are not included when designing new spaces and communities.184 
In the case of New Orleans, the threshold requirement that the tar-
geted area has experienced a blighted economy can easily be met in 
many areas of the region.185 Since most of the city’s neighborhoods are 
still in poor shape, there exists a dangerous propensity to replace cur-
rent communities with more upscale neighborhoods.186 This trend is 
commonly seen in the renewal process.187 As space will be needed to 
construct renovated homes and businesses, some residents’ neighbor-
hoods may be sacrificed or life in the new neighborhoods will simply 
become too costly. 
 This danger still lurks beneath proposed plans for rebuilding New 
Orleans. Among the plans for rebuilding, the Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission proposed: (1) “Parks in every neighborhood”; (2) “Multi-
functional parks and open spaces connect neighborhoods and em-
ployment”; (3) “Identify properties that can become part of the system 
[of redevelopment]”; (4) “Secure funding for park restoration”; (5) 
“Complete acquisition of necessary properties”; (6) “Consolidate public 
and private ownership”; (7) “Issue developer requests for proposals and 
select developers”; (8) “Buy and sell property for redevelopment, in-
cluding use of eminent domain as a last resort”; and (9) “Aggressively 
                                                                                                                      
owner-occupied housing in the White working class neighborhoods and more 
rental properties in Black and Latino neighborhoods. 
 . . . As a result, the private real estate market was depressed, and the visible 
signifier of this depression and disinvestment was race. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
184 Fullilove, supra note 5, at 59–60; Bezdek, supra note 87, at 64. Bezdek states: 
In today’s urban boom cycle, however, much of the change in neighborhoods 
is created not by homesteaders but by private developers anointed by local 
government, which assembles land not to build roads or stadia, but to offer to 
private developers in a frank bid to remake space in its preferred, high-end 
vision. 
Id. 
185 See Shelby C. Stone, Comment, Two Tales of One City: Eminent Domain Post-Katrina 
and a Response to Kelo, 53 Loy. L. Rev. 115, 148 (2007) (noting the abundance of blighted 
property in post-Katrina New Orleans). 
186 See James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent Domain 
and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 923, 961–62 (2006) (“Re-
development experts offer little more comfort to residents of poor neighborhoods when 
they tell them that they are being displaced to make way for new and beautiful homes for 
others . . . .”). 
187 See Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Develop-
ment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 295, 332–33 (1999). 
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support a modified Baker bill to accommodate buy-out of homeowners 
in heavily flooded and damaged areas for 100% of pre-Katrina market 
value, less insurance recovery proceeds and mortgage.”188 For those 
skeptical of traditional urban renewal plans, the New Orleans rebuild-
ing plans raise a number of red flags. Among those are: (1) the pro-
posed use of eminent domain; (2) the designation that a park be 
placed in every neighborhood (which implies that some prior property 
will be used); and (3) the proposal that property owners be awarded 
compensation based on pre-Katrina property value.189 These items are 
red flags because they presuppose alterations of neighborhoods to 
formulations much different than those in existence before Hurricane 
Katrina. Displaced New Orleaneans considering returning home will be 
offered accommodations in neighborhoods that no longer reflect their 
previous lives, thereby continuing their feelings of displacement. Fur-
thermore, individuals often witnessed, after selling their property, that 
in newly redeveloped areas property value increased upwards of five to 
ten times the purchase amount.190 Thus, having been reimbursed only 
the pre-Hurricane Katrina market value for their property, many 
homeowners might not be able to afford any property in their con-
verted, post-renewal neighborhood.191 Some equity-based percentage 
must be computed in the compensation package. 
 Finally, the proposal for redevelopment does not provide any 
compensation or housing allocation for residents who were renters and 
not property owners.192 Their displacement and inability to afford lodg-
                                                                                                                      
188 Urban Planning Comm., supra note 84. 
189 See id. 
190See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspec-
tive, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 333, 370 (1984). Salsich states: 
The conventional wisdom is that property values have to be raised above 
minimum code standards to attract the type of persons who will stimulate re-
vitalization. Substantial rehabilitation of a neighborhood’s housing stock 
raises property values, but it also forces up the cost of that housing and con-
tributes to the ultimate displacement of long-term residents who cannot af-
ford the increased costs. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see Christian Harris, Recent Development, Constitutional Amend-
ments, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 635, 636 (2002) (noting that increased property 
values naturally flow from redevelopment). 
191 See Brown & Williams, supra note 128, at 701–02 (discussing that residents are gen-
erally compensated only for their property’s predevelopment worth, despite the near inevi-
tability of an increase in value postdevelopment). 
192 See id. at 706–07 (noting that the renewal process will focus on providing residential 
homes, and that developers would have to be given special incentives to participate in the 
redevelopment of rental housing “affordable to returning residents”). 
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ing in the new neighborhood will be just as real as for property own-
ers.193 Consequently, renters must be compensated in some form for 
the value of intended use or for the projected difference between new 
rents and old rents. Advocates for New Orleans residents should insist 
that city officials make their approval of development plans contingent 
on developers reserving units for poorer renters at affordable rates. 
 While there does not yet exist an exact numerical figure for re-
turning New Orleaneans, such uncertainty should not be deemed an 
impediment to an equitable implementation of renewal plans.194 
Whether or not New Orleans residents choose to come back, they have 
an equitable interest in their neighborhoods that deserves protection 
from economic displacement and undercompensation. These indi-
viduals have made an emotional and social contribution to the city and 
thereby should be considered as having property rights in the commu-
nity. Their social contributions—i.e., community developments, collec-
tive work, coalition building, protection of families and their neighbor-
hoods—facilitated the reputation of New Orleans before the 
Hurricane, which many were eager to visit multiple times a year.195 
 The concerns faced by communities in New Orleans are consistent 
with those faced by other communities experiencing the results of re-
newal plans.196 Urban centers subject to renewal commonly struggle to 
balance the interests of builders with concerns that homeowners are 
undercompensated for taken property.197 The award of market value 
buy-outs to low-income homeowners is insufficient both to cover the 
predicted costs these homeowners will face, discussed above, and to 
compensate for the intangible value of the property to the individual 
homeowner.198 Considering the lack of bargaining power between low-
                                                                                                                      
193 Id. 
194 See Joe Gyan Jr., Much Has Changed Since Katrina—and Much Hasn’t *** Two Years 
Later *** Some Areas Seem Stuck in Time, Advoc. (Baton Rouge, LA), Aug. 26, 2007, at A1 
(“[M]ore than 27,000 FEMA trailers still dot the landscape in the southeastern tip of Lou-
isiana.”); Rick Jervis, 66% Are Back in New Orleans, but Basic Services Still Lag, USA Today, 
Aug. 12, 2007, at A3 (noting that the current number is in line with the mayor’s forecast, 
but the number is neither final nor definite being that it is based on postal service records 
of people actively receiving mail in the area). 
195 See McFarlane, New Inner City, supra note 78, at 57. 
196 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 94. 
197 See id. at 94, 98. 
198 See Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Rede-
velopment, 34 Ecology L.Q. 1, 15 (2007) (“Recent studies have concluded that relocation 
compensation is higher than actual relocation cost, and that in many cases governments 
utilize the relocation assistance as a de facto surrogate for addressing intangible costs.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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income homeowners and commercial developers, low-income home-
owners are often not in a position to negotiate the best price possi-
ble.199 In the valuation of property, developers often overlook “the 
pesky question of the subjective understandings of the value and nature 
of property harbored by the owners of property. . . . In short, sterile 
formulations of fair-market value often do not satisfy landowners who 
are losing their land to the forces of condemnation.”200 
 Instead of merely awarding the market value to low-income own-
ers, city redevelopment plans should require that developers provide 
one of two alternatives: (1) the approximation of the value of prop-
erty post redevelopment, or (2) the value of the property predevel-
opment plus a percentage of any future profits.201 City officials can be 
forced to include these terms as part of the negotiation package if 
adequate public pressure is used.202 In turn, private developers desir-
ous to attract more contracts will eventually come to view such conces-
sions as the least costly alternative.203 This standard would be consis-
tent with principles of fairness and justice and in accord with the 
spirit of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.204 
 Moreover, a more equitable solution for renters would be to condi-
tion building permits with requirements to designate specific afford-
able housing units to low-income individuals who stand to be displaced. 
As the level of accountability placed on New Orleans city officials illus-
trates, local governments have great incentives to encourage a fairer 
                                                                                                                      
199 See Brown & Williams, supra note 128, at 701–02. 
200 See James S. Burling, Do Economic Results of a Transfer To a Private Developer Constitute 
“Public Use?”, 2006 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 679, 681–82, available at SL049 ALI-ABA 
679 (Westlaw). 
201 See Bezdek, supra note 87, at 97–99. 
202 See Anastasia C. Sheffler-Wood, Comment, Where Do We Go from Here? States Revise 
Eminent Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 617, 637–38, 642–43 (2006). 
“The public outcry has turned into action as homeowners form grassroots campaigns to 
express their views to state legislators.” Id. at 637–38. For example, “Nevada enacted statu-
tory amendments that provide that government cannot exercise eminent domain for re-
development purposes unless it has negotiated in good faith with the property owner, pro-
vided a written compensation offer, and supplied an appraisal report corresponding to the 
compensation offer.” Id. at 643. 
203 This cost-benefit analysis is a calculation that corporate entities often have to make 
in the face of public outrage. The recent Imus controversy, is one of the many examples of 
corporate entities deciding to minimize future loss by making decisions that might appear 
costly in the present. This balancing act is yet another example of the Interest Conver-
gence Theory at play. See Bell, supra note 13, at 22. 
204 See Sheffler-Wood, supra note 202, at 618. 
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fractioning of property.205 In New Orleans, the pressure from grassroots 
activists and private individuals has forced the local government to be 
of the utmost transparency in redeveloping New Orleans.206 This type 
of accountability requires ongoing activism by invested parties to en-
sure that residents of low-income communities remain involved in de-
veloping and implementing the plans to rebuild their neighbor-
hoods.207 
 One positive outgrowth of the efforts to rebuild New Orleans is 
the demonstration that political incentives are not yet obsolete tools 
of change. For example, when New Orleans officials announced plans 
for rebuilding in January 2006, overwhelming outcry from local and 
national advocates forced the city to delay proposals that called for 
unilateral decisions on which areas would be rebuilt.208 “The 17-
member Bring New Orleans Back commission largely side-stepped 
that issue . . . [by creating] 13 districts where residents will work with 
planners to explore opportunities for rebuilding and work to deter-
mine how many people ultimately [will return to the region].”209 New 
Orleans officials, aware of the pressures of accountability to the pub-
lic, were deliberate in their plan to include New Orleans residents in 
the decisionmaking process.210 This situation highlights Derrick Bell’s 
Interest Convergence Theory.211 The New Orleans officials, after hav-
ing received such bad press for their collective failure to provide for 
the needs of their disadvantaged citizens during the hurricane, 
needed to show the world that redevelopment will take place in con-
junction with New Orleaneans.212 Without constant supervision, the 
egalitarian solution proposed in this Article will not be successful. 
                                                                                                                      
205 See Scott L. Cummings, The Trickle After the Flood, 15 J. Affordable Housing & 
Community Dev. L. 12, 12–13 (2005), available at 15-FALL JAHCDL 12 (Westlaw) (noting 
the importance of the community’s voice in assuring accountability with “what will amount 
to $200 billion in disaster relief”). 
206 See Adam Nossiter, In New Orleans, Money Is Ready but a Plan Isn’t, N.Y. Times, June 
18, 2006, at § 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/us/nationalspecial/18 
orleans.html?_r=1&emc=eta1&oref=slogin. 
207 See Cummings, supra note 205, at 13 (“[M]arket-driven efforts without adequate 
opportunities for community participation typically result in the massive displacement of 
poor residents of color.”). 
208 Id.; Joyce, supra note 144; see also WDSU New Orleans, supra note 144. 
209 See Greg Allen, New Orleans Officials Unveil Rebuilding Plan, NPR, Sept. 12, 2006, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5151102. 
210 See id. 
211 See Bell, supra note 13, at 22. 
212 See William L. Waugh Jr., The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters, 
604 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 10, 19–21 (2006), available at http://ann.sagepub. 
com/cgi/content/abstract/604/1/10 (discussing the failures of the government to act in 
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 The pressure for accountability can also motivate local govern-
ments to require that local developers designate units for low-income 
renters and potential homeowners.213 Since developers potentially will 
reap the most profits from redevelopment, and thus the displace-
ment, city leaders have good reason to require developers to shoulder 
more of the costs related to displacement. The post-Katrina Gulf 
Coast is pregnant with possibilities for producing a model of more 
fruitful and nonexclusionary redevelopment.214 Katrina revealed that 
many white Americans have vested interests in making sure that eco-
nomic measures benefit a larger group of Americans rather than a 
smaller number.215 There might be a vested interest for groups to ally 
themselves, not only along racial lines, but also economic lines and 
commonalities. Applying Bell’s Interest Convergence Theory, many 
affluent Americans might now find that their interest in governmental 
transparency and efficiency converge with poor individuals’ interest 
in being protected.216 The new awareness and visibility that media 
coverage brought to New Orleans caused everyone to feel invested in 
the success of New Orleans.217 The slow response to help New Or-
leaneans during the hurricane generated national sympathy for the 
region.218 Much like the international coverage of the brutality of seg-
                                                                                                                      
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and the damage control that governmental officials have 
attempted to affect with regard to housing, education and the like). 
213 A number of local organizations, such as the People’s Organizing Committee, an 
organization dedicated to helping New Orleans residents with housing issues and with 
educating them about their legal rights and remedies, organize at a grassroots level to 
compensate for shortcomings in government services and bring these shortcomings to the 
public’s attention. See People’s Organizing Committee, http://www.peoplesorganizing.org 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2007). 
214 New Orleans demonstrated that a huge number of the American population lives 
well below the poverty level and that, more than ever, race and class are tightly linked. In 
the surge of generosity that followed the disaster, one hopes that the old tendency to view 
the victims of poverty as irresponsible, lazy, and deserving of their fate will now be seen as 
flawed. Post-Katrina discussions of poverty should center on the elements that contribute 
to the disenfranchisement of the poor and on how those elements can be defeated. See 
Alexandre, supra note 180, at 165–66. 
215 See Larkin M. Moore, Note, Stranded Again: The Inadequacy of Federal Plans to Rebuild 
an Affordable New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. Third World L.J. 227, 240–47 
(2007) (discussing the bill proposed by Robert Baker in response to the government’s 
failure to adequately assist those displaced by Katrina). 
216 See Bell, supra note 13, at 22. 
217 See Cheryl I. Harris, Review Essay, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 Cal. 
L. Rev. 907, 935–36 (2006) (reviewing Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: 
The Myth of a Color-Blind Society (2003)) (discussing effect of media coverage of 
Hurricane Katrina). 
218 See id. 
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regation provided an opportunity for disparate interests to converge 
in the 1950s, a window now exists for socially diverse contingencies 
with interrelated interests to ally themselves with each other. 
 Due to public demand for accountability by New Orleans offi-
cials, the city’s government has been compelled to consider inclusive 
redevelopment plans.219 In the face of marches and protests by resi-
dents, covered by the national media, the city officials have had to re-
assure residents that their concerns will be considered.220 The rede-
velopment plans are still tentative, but if the public pressure remains, 
city officials will have to alter noninclusive proposals. Hurricane 
Katrina not only accelerated the need for development, which was 
long overdue in many New Orleans neighborhoods, but also placed 
considerations of equity at the forefront of the redevelopment de-
bate.221 
Conclusion 
 When the effects of redevelopment decisions on the lives of the 
poor are examined, it becomes clear that “just compensation” and 
public purpose must be reassessed to prevent exclusion of the poor 
from their life-long residences and communities or, at least, to pro-
vide sufficient compensation for their displacement.222 Although 
courts have allowed eminent domain to be used for the benefit of pri-
vate developers if the land is used for public use, “beyond [this] gen-
eral rule there is little or no agreement as to what constitutes public 
use.”223 Many have expressed that the term “is ‘elastic.’”224 
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Ct. App. 1954)). 
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 I maintain that public purpose should be defined based on equi-
table considerations that incorporate the interests of economically 
vulnerable members of the community. The new definition not only 
benefits low-income residents by incorporating their predominant 
interests into the actual development plans, but would also provide 
long-term benefits to local officials by maintaining their political in-
tegrity and public accountability. These new urban redevelopment 
models will help provide a modicum of confidence and satisfaction in 
local officials’ commitment to poor communities and communities of 
color and might help create pecuniary resources that help curtail re-
sorts to violent crimes—this reduction would directly benefit wealth-
ier members of a community. 
 Additional broad scale benefits of interest convergence that devel-
oping communities would likely manifest would include lowered crime 
rates, as a greater population experiences the various gains that come 
with rising property values. This interest is not only a local interest, but 
a national interest, as well. Expanding the definition of public purpose 
to include the interests of low-income community members promotes 
the establishment of stable communities among mixed-income con-
stituents, accomplishing a fundamental incentive to redevelopment. 
 The proposed redefinition of public purpose would not only 
honor the contributions made by residents via social capital and help 
prevent displacement, but would also ensure that city officials and pri-
vate developers become more mindful of the need to make sure that all 
development decisions are in compliance with established standards of 
environmental justice.225 The patterns of displacement that have con-
stantly resulted from the implementation of urban renewal plans, as 
well as the psychological trauma and the loss of income that often re-
sult from the displacement, cause a grave disproportionate injustice to 
disempowered members of these communities. This injustice violates 
the tenets of the goals of federal environmental statutes  geared toward 
preventing environmental injustice against minority and poor popula-
tions.226 The creation of the aforementioned incentives, as well as the 
                                                                                                                      
225 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(providing analysis that, arguably, renders disparate impact claims still enforceable under 
Title VI). Absent clear congressional intent, courts should defer to reasonable agency in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutes. See Coliseum Square Ass'n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 
231–33 (5th Cir. 2006); Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc. v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 
582, 604 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that “any agency actions taken pursuant to the provisions 
of the Order are not subject to judicial review”). 
226 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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broadening of the definition of public purpose to prevent displace-
ment of poor populations, consequently, not only allows city officials 
and developers to achieve their political and economic goals, but also 
ensures that economic and environemental justice remain a paramount 
focus in all urban renewal decisions.227 In adopting the above propos-
als, developers and city officials would serve their respective interests 
and those of economically marginalized individuals, as well as ensure 
that they remain compliant with the mandates of federal environ-
mental laws. 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Memorandum from the Administrator of the U.S. EPA to Assistant Administrators, 
Regional Administrators, Associate Administrators, Office Directors, General Counsel, Chief 
Financial Officer, and Inspector General, Reaffirming the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Commitment to Environmental Justice 1–2 (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ej/admin-ej-commit-letter-110305.pdf. See gener-
ally U.S. EPA, Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities (1992), avail-
able at http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31476.pdf (discussing agency workgroup’s efforts to 
promote environmental equity). 
  
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
